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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the potential benefits of the massive multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) enabled heterogeneous cloud radio access network (C-RAN) in terms of the secrecy and
energy efficiency (EE). In this network, both remote radio heads (RRHs) and massive MIMO
macrocell base stations (BSs) are deployed and soft fractional frequency reuse (S-FFR) is adopted
to mitigate the inter-tier interference. We first examine the physical layer security by deriving the
area ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability. Our results reveal that the use of massive
MIMO and C-RAN can greatly improve the secrecy performance. For C-RAN, a large number of
RRHs achieves high area ergodic secrecy rate and low secrecy outage probability, due to its powerful
interference management. We find that for massive MIMO aided macrocells, having more antennas
and serving more users improves secrecy performance. Then we derive the EE of the heterogeneous
C-RAN, illustrating that increasing the number of RRHs significantly enhances the network EE.
Furthermore, it is indicated that allocating more radio resources to the RRHs can linearly increase
the EE of RRH tier and improve the network EE without affecting the EE of the macrocells.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
As a new mobile network architecture consisting of remote radio heads (RRHs) and baseband units (BBUs),
cloud radio access network (C-RAN) can deal with large-scale control/data processing much more efficiently.
The rationale behind this is that baseband processing is centralized and coordinated among sites in the cen-
tralized BBU pool, which reduces the capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operating expenditure (OPEX) of
the networks [1]. Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) is another key technology that promises
outstanding spectral efficiency (SE) and energy efficiency (EE). In massive MIMO antenna systems, base stations
(BSs) are equipped with large antenna arrays to support a large number of users in the same time-frequency
domain [2]. Among other emerging technologies such as device-to-device communications, full duplex radios,
and millimeter wave, etc., C-RAN and massive MIMO are identified as promising 5G technologies [3–5].
Driven by its high SE and EE, C-RAN has recently received tremendous attention from both industry and
academia [6, 7]. For instance, a group of single-antenna RRHs were considered to form a distributed antenna
array, and two downlink transmission strategies namely best RRH selection and distributed beamforming were
examined in terms of outage probability in [7]. Most recently in [8], user-centric association in a multi-tier
C-RAN was proposed, in which the RRH that had the best signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) was scheduled to serve
the user. Compared to [7], downlink transmission in the C-RAN with a group of multi-antenna RRHs was
investigated in [9]. In the work of [9], maximal ratio transmission and transmit antenna selection were adopted
at the RRHs, and the outage probability was derived by considering several transmission schemes such as RRH
selection and distributed beamforming.
Heterogeneous C-RAN is a new paradigm by integrating cloud computing with heterogeneous networks
(HetNets) [10, 11]. In heterogeneous C-RAN, severe inter-tier interference is coordinated for the enhancement
of SE and EE. The architecture of heterogenous C-RAN with massive MIMO is envisioned as an appealing
solution, since none of these techniques can solely achieve the 5G targets [4, 10]. In [10], the opportunities and
challenges for heterogenous C-RAN with massive MIMO were discussed, and it was mentioned that the proper
densities of the massive MIMO macrocell BSs (MBSs) and RRHs in the networks should be addressed. While
the significance of heterogenous C-RAN with massive MIMO has been highlighted in the prior works [6, 10],
more research efforts should be devoted to proper characterization of this combination.
Although C-RAN can effectively mitigate the inter-RRH interference by using interference management
techniques such as coordinated multi-point (CoMP), the inter-tier interference between the RRHs and MBSs may
be problematic in the heterogeneous C-RAN, due to the limited radio resources. Soft fractional frequency reuse
(S-FFR) is viewed as an efficient inter-tier interference coordination approach. In [11], S-FFR was considered
in the heterogeneous C-RAN to both mitigate the inter-tier interference and enhance the spectrum efficiency.
Recent developments have showed physical layer security as an innovative solution for safeguarding wireless
networks. The rationale behind this is to exploit the randomness inherent in wireless channels such as fading or
artificial noise, etc. in order to transmit information confidentially [12]. In contrast to traditional cryptographic
approaches, physical layer security based techniques do not rely on computational complexity and have very
good scalability [13]. The emergence of massive MIMO also introduces new opportunities for providing physical
layer security, e.g., [13–15]. In particular, in [14], matched filter precoding and artificial noise generation
3were considered to secure downlink transmission in a multicell massive MIMO system in the presence of
an eavesdropper. Subsequently in [15], passive eavesdropping and active attacks were investigated in massive
MIMO systems with physical layer security, which illustrates that passive eavesdropping has little effect on
the secrecy capacity for the case of considering only one single-antenna eavesdropper. While these recent
contributions certainly laid a solid foundation in massive MIMO systems with physical layer security, such a
research area is still far from being well understood. The research on physical layer security in the C-RAN is
also in its infancy, and we believe it is a new highly rewarding candidate for physical layer security due to at
least the following two crucial factors:
• Low-power RRHs are densely placed in C-RAN [1] so the distance between user and its serving RRH is
short, which decreases the risk of information leakage.
• The inter-RRH interference is mitigated in the C-RAN. As such, all other RRHs can act as “friendly
jammers” to confound the eavesdroppers [16–18].
Thus, massive MIMO and C-RAN offer a wealth of opportunities at the physical layer to secure communication.
Motivated by the aforementioned background, in this paper, we explore the benefits of massive MIMO aided
heterogeneous C-RAN by investigating its secrecy and EE performance. We consider downlink transmission
in a two-tier heterogeneous C-RAN, in which the RRHs co-exist with the massive MIMO aided macrocells.
To control the inter-tier interference to an acceptable level, S-FFR is used to allocate the radio resources
appropriately. Different from [11, 14, 15], in this paper, the RRHs and massive MIMO MBSs are spatially
distributed under the framework of stochastic geometry. While [7, 9] considered only one single user in the
network with multiple RRHs around the user coverage area and evaluated the performance from the standpoint
of the user, we analyze the secrecy and EE of the entire network. In summary, our contributions are that:
• We provide a tractable analytical framework to characterize the secrecy and EE performance of hetero-
geneous C-RAN aided by massive MIMO. Our analysis accounts for the key features of massive MIMO
and C-RAN, i.e., large antenna arrays and simultaneously serving multiple users for massive MIMO, and
large numbers of RRHs and inter-RRH interference mitigation for C-RAN.
• We also study the area ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability in this network. Our results
illustrate that accommodating more users by the massive MIMO empowered MBSs increases the area
ergodic secrecy rate and decreases the secrecy outage probability, while it has negligible effect on the
RRH’s performance. Deploying large numbers of RRHs increases the area ergodic secrecy rate and
decreases the secrecy outage probability.
• In addition, our results demonstrate that the effect of S-FFR on the area ergodic secrecy rate of the network
can be distinct depending on the RRH density. Moreover, the EE of the RRH tier linearly increases with
their dedicated radio resources, and the network EE is improved by using more RRHs and more radio
resources to be allocated to the RRHs.
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Fig. 1. An illustration of two-tier heterogeneous C-RAN, where the red dash lines represent the backhual links between the
macrocell base stations and BBU pool via X2/S1 interfaces, and the green solid lines represent the fronthaul links between
the RRHs and BBU pool via optical fiber link.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS
A. Network Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider the downlink of a two-tier heterogeneous C-RAN, where the BBU pool
in the cloud is established to coordinate the entire network. Massive MIMO enabled MBSs of the first tier, as
high power nodes (HPNs), are connected with the BBU pool via backhaul link, while the RRHs of the second
tier, as low power nodes (LPNs), are connected with the BBU pool via fronthaul link (optical fibre link). In this
model, we have eavesdroppers (Eves) passively intercepting the secrecy messages without any active attacks.
The locations of Eves are modeled as a homogeneous Poisson point process (HPPP) Φe with density λe.1 On
the other hand, the locations of MBSs are modeled as an independent HPPP ΦM with density λM, and we
model the locations of RRHs by an independent HPPP ΦR with density λR.
Equipped with NM antennas, each MBS uses zero-forcing beamforming (ZFBF) to communicate with S
single-antenna users over the same resource block (RB) (NM ≫ S ≥ 1) using equal power assignment.
The ZFBF matrix at a MBS is W=G
(
G
H
G
)−1
with the channel matrix G [20], where (·)H denotes the
Hermitian transpose. Each RRH is equipped with a single-antenna and serves a single-antenna user over one
RB. All channels are assumed to undergo independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) quasi-static Rayleigh block
1In practice, the behavior of users is unknown and they can also act as malicious Eves, therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that the locations of Eves follow PPP [19].
5fading. Further, each user is assumed to be connected with its nearest BS such that the Euclidean plane is
divided into Poisson-Voronoi cells.
We consider the adoption of S-FFR for inter-tier interference mitigation and assume that there are a total
of K RBs, the number of RBs allocated to RRHs is αK , and the number of RBs shared by RRHs and MBSs
is (1− α)K , in which α denotes the S-FFR factor, with (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). Since inter-RRH interference can be
efficiently mitigated via cooperation among RRHs, same radio resources can be shared among the RRHs in the
C-RAN [11]. For RRH transmission over the k-th RB allocated to RRHs, the receive signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) at a typical user can be expressed as
γR,k =
PR
BoNo
hR,kβ |Xo,R|−ηR , k = 1, . . . , αK (1)
where PR is the RRH transmit power allocated to each RB, Bo is the bandwidth per RB, hR,k ∼ exp(1) is
the small-scale fading channel power gain, β is a frequency dependent constant value, which is typically set
as ( c4πfc )
2 with c = 3× 108m/s and the carrier frequency fc, ηR is the pathloss exponent, |Xo,R| denotes the
distance between the typical user and its typical serving RRH, and No is the power spectrum density of the
noise and the weak inter-RRH interference. For RRH transmission over the ν-th RB shared by the RRHs and
MBSs, the receive SINR at a typical user is written as
γR,ν =
PRhR,νβ |Xo,R|−ηR
IM,ν +BoNo
, ν = 1, . . . , (1− α)K (2)
where hR,ν ∼ exp(1) is the small-scale fading channel power gain, IM,ν is the inter-tier interference from the
MBSs, which is given by
IM,ν =
∑
ℓ∈ΦM
PM
S
hℓ,νβ |Xℓ,M|−ηM , (3)
where PM is the MBS transmit power of each RB, hℓ,ν ∼ Γ (S, 1)2 is the small-scale fading interfering channel
power gain, |Xℓ,M| is the distance between the interfering MBS ℓ ∈ ΦM and the typical user, and ηM is the
pathloss exponent.
We consider the non-colluding eavesdropping scenario where the most malicious Eve i.e., the one with the
largest SINR of the received signal, dominates the secrecy rate [12]. Thus, for RRH transmissions over the k-th
and ν-th RB, the receive SINRs at the most malicious Eve e∗ are given by
γe
∗
R,k = max
e∈Φe
{
PRh
e
R,kβ
∣∣Xeo,R∣∣−ηR
IeR,k +BoNe
}
, (4)
and
γe
∗
R,ν = max
e∈Φe
{
PRh
e
R,νβ
∣∣Xeo,R∣∣−ηR
IeR,ν + I
e
M,ν +BoNe
}
, (5)
respectively, where heR,i(i ∈ {k, ν}) ∼ exp(1) and
∣∣Xeo,R∣∣ are the small-scale fading eavesdropping channel
power gain and the distance between the typical serving RRH and the Eve e ∈ Φe, respectively, Ne is the noise
2Γ (·, ·) is the upper incomplete gamma function [21, (8.350)].
6power spectrum density, IeR,i and IeM,ν are the interference from the RRHs and MBSs, which are found as

IeR,i =
∑
j∈ΦR/o
PRh
e
j,iβ
∣∣Xej,R∣∣−ηR ,
IeM,ν =
∑
ℓ∈ΦM
PM
S
heℓ,νβ
∣∣Xeℓ,M∣∣−ηM ,
(6)
where hej,i ∼ exp(1) and
∣∣Xej,R∣∣ are the small-scale fading interfering channel power gain and the distance
between the RRH j ∈ ΦR/o (except the typical serving RRH) and the Eve, respectively, heℓ,ν ∼ Γ (S, 1) [20]
and
∣∣∣Xeℓ,M∣∣∣ are the small-scale fading interfering channel power gain and the distance between the MBS ℓ ∈ ΦM
and the Eve, respectively.
Due to the limited backhaul capacity, the inter-MBS interference is assumed to be not mitigated. Thus, for
MBS transmission over the ν-th RB shared by RRHs and MBSs, the receive SINR at a typical user is written
as
γM,ν =
PM
S gM,νβ |Xo,M|−ηM
JM,ν + JR,ν +BoN1
, (7)
where gM,ν ∼ Γ (NM − S + 1, 1) is the small-scale fading channel power gain, |Xo,M| is the distance between
the typical user and its typical serving MBS, N1 is the power spectrum density of the noise. In (7), JM,ν and
JR,ν are the interference from MBSs and RRHs, which are given by

JM,ν =
∑
ℓ∈ΦM/o
PM
S
gℓ,νβ |Xℓ,M|−ηM ,
JR,ν =
∑
j∈ΦR
PRgj,νβ |Xj,R|−ηR ,
(8)
where gℓ,ν ∼ Γ (S, 1) and |Xℓ,M| are the small-scale fading interfering channel power gain and the distance
between the interfering MBS ℓ ∈ ΦM/o (except the typical serving MBS) and the typical user, respectively,
gj,ν ∼ exp (1) and |Xj,R| are the small-scale interfering channel power gain and the distance between the
interfering RBS j ∈ ΦR and the typical user, respectively.
Similar to (5), for MBS transmission, the receive SINR γe∗M,ν at the most malicious Eve e∗ is given by
γe
∗
M,ν = max
e∈Φe
{
PM
S g
e
M,νβ
∣∣Xeo,M∣∣−ηM
JeM,ν + J
e
R,ν +BoNe
}
, (9)
where geM,ν ∼ exp (1) and
∣∣Xeo,M∣∣ are the small-scale fading channel power gain and distance between the
typical serving MBS and the Eve, respectively. In particular, we consider the worst-case scenario that Eves are
capable of mitigating the intra-cell interference [19]. In (9), JeM,ν and JeR,ν are the interference from the MBSs
and RRHs, respectively, given by 

JeM,ν =
∑
ℓ∈ΦM/o
PM
S
geℓ,νβ
∣∣Xeℓ,M∣∣−ηM ,
JeR,ν =
∑
j∈ΦR
PRg
e
j,νβ
∣∣Xej,R∣∣−ηR ,
(10)
where geℓ,ν ∼ Γ (S, 1) and
∣∣∣Xeℓ,M∣∣∣ are the small-scale fading interfering channel power gain and the distance
between the interfering MBS ℓ ∈ ΦM/o (except the typical serving MBS) and Eve, respectively, and gej,ν ∼
exp (1) and
∣∣Xej,R∣∣ are the small-scale fading interfering channel power gain and the distance between the
interfering RRH j ∈ ΦR and Eve, respectively.
7B. Power Consumption Model
The total power consumption at each RRH is given by
P totalR = K
PR
εR
+ P 0R + Pfh, (11)
in which εR is the efficiency of the power amplifier, P 0R is the static hardware power consumption of the RRH,
and Pfh denotes the power consumption of the fronthaul link.
We employ a general massive MIMO power consumption model proposed in [22], which can clearly specify
how the power scales with the number of antennas and active users in each macrocell. Thus, the total power
consumption at each MBS is found as
P totalM =(1− α)K
(PM
εM
+
3∑
ρ=1
(
(S)
ρ
Λρ,0
+ (S)
(ρ−1)
NMΛρ,1
))
+ P 0M + Pbh, (12)
where εM (0 < εM ≤ 1) is the efficiency of the power amplifier, the parameters Λρ,0 and Λρ,1 depend on the
transceiver chains, coding and decoding, precoding, etc., which are detailed in Section V, P 0M is the MBS’s
static hardware power consumption, and Pbh is the power consumption of the backhaul link.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the effects of massive MIMO and C-RAN on the secrecy performance are studied in terms
of both the area ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability.
Secrecy outage probability captures the probability of both reliability and secrecy for one transmission.
A. Area Ergodic Secrecy Rate
Area ergodic secrecy rate represents the secrecy capacity limitation of the network, which allows us to
investigate the impacts of different densities of RRHs and massive MIMO macrocells on the network secrecy
performance. We first study the ergodic capacity of the channel between the typical RRH and its served user,
which is given as follows.
Theorem 1. When using the k-th RB allocated to the RRHs, the ergodic capacity C¯R,k of the channel between
the typical RRH and its served user is derived as (13) (see top of next page). When using the ν-th RB shared
by the RRHs and MBSs, the ergodic capacity C¯R,ν of the channel between the typical RRH and its served user
is derived as (14), where B(·) [·, ·] is the incomplete beta function [21, (8.391)].3
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix A.
We next derive the ergodic capacity of the channel between the most malicious eavesdropper and the typical
RRH, which is given as follows:
3 Note that the special functions such as incomplete beta function have been included in the commonly-used mathematical
softwares such as Mathematic and Matlab, and can be directly calculated.
8C¯R,k =
2pi
ln 2
(λR + λM)
∫ ∞
0
e
BoNo
PRβ
xηR
Γ
(
0,
BoNo
PRβ
xηR
)
xe−pi(λR+λM)x
2
dx, (13)
C¯R,ν =
2pi
ln 2
(λR + λM)
∫ ∞
0
[∫ ∞
0
F¯
γR,ν |{|Xo,R|=x} (γ)
1 + γ
dγ
]
xe−pi(λR+λM)x
2
dx, (14)
with
F¯
γR,ν |{|Xo,R|=x} (γ) = e
−BoNo
PRβ
xηRγ×
exp
{
− λM2pi
S∑
µ=1
(
S
µ
)(
xηRγPM
PRS
)µ(xηRγPM
PRS
)−µ+ 2
ηM
ηM
B(
−
xηR−ηMγPM
PRS
)
[
µ− 2
ηM
, 1− S
]}
(15)
C¯e
∗
R,k =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1− Fγe∗
R,k
(x)
1 + x
dx, (16)
with
Fγe∗
R,k
(x) = exp
{
− 2piλe
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
− r
ηRx
PRβ
BoNe − λRpiΓ
(
1 +
2
ηR
)
Γ
(
1− 2
ηR
)(
rηRx
) 2
ηR
]
rdr
}
(17)
C¯e
∗
R,ν =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1− Fγe∗
R,ν
(x)
1 + x
dx, (18)
with
Fγe∗
R,ν
(x) = exp
{
− 2piλe
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
− r
ηRx
PRβ
BoNe − λRpiΓ
(
1 +
2
ηR
)
Γ
(
1− 2
ηR
)(
rηRx
) 2
ηR
− 2piλM
S∑
µ=1
(
S
µ
)(
rηRxPM
PRS
) 2
ηM
Γ
(
µ− 2
ηM
)
Γ
(
−µ+ 2
ηM
+ S
)
ηMΓ (S)
]
rdr
}
(19)
Theorem 2. For RRH transmissions over the k-th RB and ν-th RB, the ergodic capacity C¯e∗R,k and C¯e
∗
R,ν of the
most malicious eavesdropper’s channel are derived as (16) and (18), respectively, in the next page.
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix B.
Based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 , using Jensen’s inequality that E {max (X,Y )} ≥ max (E {x} ,E {Y }),
9the ergodic secrecy rate for the typical RRH transmission over the k-th RB is lower bounded as [14, 23]
RsR,k =
[
C¯R,k − C¯e
∗
R,k
]+
, (20)
where [x]+ = max {x, 0}.
Likewise, the ergodic secrecy rate for the typical RRH transmission over the ν-th RB is lower bounded as
RsR,ν =
[
C¯R,ν − C¯e
∗
R,ν
]+
. (21)
Remark 2: From the results in Theorem 1, Theorem 2, (20) and (21), we realize that the ergodic secrecy rate
for RRH transmission increases with the density of RRHs, which can be explained by the facts that: 1) When
deploying more RRHs in the same area, the distance between the legitimate user and its associated RRH is
shorter, which decreases the pathloss; and 2) more interference from RRHs is present at the eavesdroppers,
which degrades the eavesdropping channel.
The area ergodic secrecy rate (in bits/s/m2) of the RRH tier in the heterogeneous C-RAN is calculated as
RsR = λR
(
αKBoR
s
R,k + (1− α)KBoRsR,ν
)
. (22)
For MBS transmission, we have a tractable lower bound expression for the ergodic capacity of the channel
between the typical MBS and its serving user as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For MBS transmission over the ν-th RB, the ergodic capacity of the channel between the typical
MBS and its served user is lower bounded in closed-form as
C¯LM,ν = log2
(
1 + exp
(
ln
(
PM
S
β
)
+ ψ (NM − S + 1)− ηM
2
(ψ (1)− ln (π (λR + λM)))− ln
( PMβ2πλMΓ (2− ηM2 )
(ηM − 2) (πλM + πλR)1−
ηM
2
+
PRβ2πλRΓ
(
2− ηR2
)
(ηR − 2) (πλM + πλR)1−
ηR
2
+ BoN1
)))
, (23)
where ψ (·) is the digamma function [24]. For very large NM, ψ (NM − S + 1) ≈ ln (NM − S + 1) [25].
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix C.
For MBS transmission over the ν-th RB, the ergodic capacity C¯e∗M,ν of the most malicious eavesdropper’s
channel is derived as
C¯e
∗
M,ν = E
{
log2
(
1 + γe
∗
M,ν
)}
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1− Fγe∗
M,ν
(x)
1 + x
dx, (24)
where Fγe∗
M,ν
(x) is given by (25) in the next page, which can be easily obtained by following the proof of
Theorem 2. Based on Theorem 3 and (24), the ergodic secrecy rate for the typical MBS transmission over
the ν-th RB is lower bounded as
RsM,ν =
[
C¯LM,ν − C¯e
∗
M,ν
]+
. (26)
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Fγe∗
M,ν
(x) = exp
{
− 2piλe
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
− Sr
ηMx
PMβ
B0N1 − λRpi (PRβ)
2
ηR Γ
(
1 +
2
ηR
)
Γ
(
1− 2
ηR
)
(
SrηMx
PMβ
) 2
ηR − 2piλM
S∑
µ=1
(
S
µ
)
(rηMx)
2
ηM
Γ
(
µ− 2
ηM
)
Γ
(
−µ + 2
ηM
+ S
)
ηMΓ (S)
]
rdr
}
(25)
Remark 3: From the results in (23), (24), and (26), we establish that the ergodic secrecy rate is improved
by increasing the number of MBS antennas, due to the fact that only the served legitimate users can obtain the
large array gains.
The area ergodic secrecy rate (in bits/s/m2) of the MBS tier in the heterogeneous C-RAN is calculated as
RsM = λM (1− α)KBoSRsM,ν . (27)
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
In the above, we have studied the secrecy capacity in the massive MIMO aided heterogeneous C-RAN. Since
Eves only intercept the secrecy massages passively without any transmissions, the channel state information
(CSI) of the eavesdropping channels cannot be obtained by the BSs or legitimate users. In this circumstance,
the BSs set the transmission rate R consisting of the secrecy codewords and non-secrecy codewords, and a
constant rate of the secrecy codewords Rs (Rs ≤ R). Secrecy outage is declared when the targeted secrecy rate
Rs cannot be guaranteed.
1) Delay-Limited Mode: In the delay-limited mode, a rate R is set under certain connection outage
constraint. For RRH transmission over the k-th RB allocated to the RRHs, given a distance |X0,R| = d0 between
a typical RRH and its serving user, the connection outage probability is given by
P coR,k (R) = Pr (log2 (1 + γR,k) < R)
= 1− exp
(
−BoNo
PRβ
dηRo
(
2R − 1)) . (28)
For RRH transmission over the ν-th RB shared by RRHs and MBSs, the connection outage probability is
P coR,ν (R) = Pr (log2 (1 + γR,ν) < R)
= 1− F¯γR,ν |{|Xo,R|=do}
(
2R − 1) , (29)
where F¯γR,ν |{|Xo,R|=x} (·) is given by (15).
Remark 4: From (28) and (29), we see that when a typical RRH transmits information to its served user,
deploying more RRHs in its surrounding area has no effect on the quality of connectivity, since the inter-RRH
interference is mitigated.
11
ϕ (w) = exp
(
− 2piλR jwPRβd
2−ηR
o
ηR − 2 2F1
[
1,
ηR − 2
ηR
; 2− 2
ηR
;−jwPRβd−ηRo
]
− λM2pi
S∑
µ=1(
S
µ
)(
jw
PM
S
β
)µ (−jwPM
S
β
)−µ+ 2
ηM
ηM
B(
−jw
PM
S
βd
−ηM
o
)
[
µ− 2
ηM
, 1− S
])
(35)
Corollary 1. Given a distance |Xo,R| = do and the connection outage probability threshold σ, the typical RRH
transmission rate over the k-th RB allocated to RRHs is given by
R = log2
(
1− PRβ
BoNod
ηR
o
ln (1− σ)
)
, (30)
and the typical RRH transmission rate over the ν-th RB shared by RRHs and MBSs satisfies
R ≥ log2
(
1 +
PRS
PMd
ηR
o
∆
ηM
2
1
)
, (31)
with
∆1 = − ηMΓ (S) ln (1− σ)
2πλM
S∑
µ=1
(
S
µ
)
Γ
(
µ− 2ηM
)
Γ
(
−µ+ 2ηM + S
) . (32)
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix D.
Similar to (29), given a distance |Xo,M| = do between a typical MBS and its served user, we obtain the
connection outage probability of MBS transmission as
PcoM,ν (R) = 1− F¯γM,ν |{|Xo,M|=do}
(
2R − 1) , (33)
where F¯γM,ν |{|Xo,M|=do} (·) is the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of the receive SINR
γM,ν at the MBS. However, the exact expression for F¯γM,ν |{|Xo,M|=do} (·) involves higher order derivatives
of laplace transform using Faa` di Bruno’s formula [26], which becomes inefficient for large number of MBS
antennas. By the law of large numbers, i.e., gM,ν ≈ NM − S + 1 as NM is large, and employing Gil-Pelaez
theorem [27], we have
F¯γM,ν |{|Xo,M|=do} (γ) = Pr
( PM
S (NM − S + 1)βd−ηMo
JM,ν + JR,ν +BoN1
> γ
)
= Pr
(
JM,ν + JR,ν <
(PM
Sγ
(NM − S + 1)βd−ηMo −BoN1
))
=
1
2
− 1
π
∫ ∞
0
Im
[
e
−jw
(
PMβ
Sd
ηM
o γ
(NM−S+1)−BoN1
)
ϕ∗ (w)
]
w
dw, (34)
where j =
√−1, ϕ (w) is the conjugate of the characteristic function given by (35) (See top of this page),
which can be easily obtained by following the similar approach in Appendix A. In (35), 2F1 [·, ·; ·; ·] is the
Gauss hypergeometric function [21, (9.142)].
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Secrecy outage occurs when the equivocation rate of Eve is lower than the secrecy rate Rs. Thus, the secrecy
outage probability can be written in a general form as
Ps = Pr
(
R− log2
(
1 + γe
∗
ϑ,i
)
< Rs
)
= 1− Fγe∗
ϑ,i
(
2R−Rs − 1) , (36)
where Fγe∗
ϑ,i
(·) is the CDF of the SINR γe∗ϑ,i at the most malicious Eve. Note that here, Fγe∗
ϑ,i
(·) is given
by (17), (19) and (25) for RRH transmissions (ϑ = R, i ∈ {k, ν}) and MBS transmissions (ϑ = M, i = ν),
respectively.
Remark 5: From (36), we see that for eavesdroppers, deploying more RRHs and MBSs results in more
interference, which degrades the eavesdropping channel, thereby decreasing the secrecy outage probability.
2) Delay-Tolerant Mode: In the delay-tolerant mode, coding can be operated over a sufficient number of
independent channel realizations to experience the whole ensemble of the channel, and therefore the transmission
rate R can be set as an arbitrary value less than or equal to the ergodic capacity of the channel between the
legitimate user and its serving RRH/MBS [14]. The secrecy outage occurs when the targeted ergodic secrecy
rate Rs cannot be satisfied, i.e.,
R−Re < Rs, (37)
where Re denotes the ergodic capacity of the most malicious eavesdropper’s channel. When intercepting the
RRH transmission, Re = C¯e
∗
R,i(i ∈ {k, ν}) given by (16) and (18) respectively; and when intercepting the MBS
transmission, Re = C¯e
∗
M,ν given by (24). As mentioned in Remark 5, Re decreases with increasing the densities
of RRHs and MBSs, due to more severe interference.
It is indicated from (37) that given a secrecy rate Rs, the rate R should be set as large as possible to
avoid the secrecy outage. Based on Theorem 1, i) RRH transmission over the k-th RB allocated to RRHs, the
transmission rate R at RRH (bits/s/Hz) satisfies R ≤ C¯R,k with C¯R,k given by (13), and ii) RRH transmission
over the ν-th RB shared by the RRHs and MBSs, R at RRH satisfies R ≤ C¯R,ν with C¯R,ν given by (14).
Based on Theorem 3, for MBS transmission over the ν-th RB shared by the RRHs and MBSs, The value for
R at MBS can be at least set as R = C¯LM,ν with C¯LM,ν given by (23).
IV. ENERGY EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
One of the 5G goals is to achieve 10x reduction in energy consumption [28]. As such, EE is a very
important performance metric. In this section, we proceed to examine the EE concern in the massive MIMO
aided heterogeneous C-RAN.4
The EE for transmission from a typical RRH is given by
EERRH =
throughput
Power Consumption
=
αKBoC¯R,k + (1− α)KBoC¯R,ν
P totalR
, (38)
4Note that because the CSI of the eavesdropping channels is unknown, joint design of combining both EE and secrecy
is not feasible.
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where C¯R,k and C¯R,ν are given by (13) and (14), respectively, based on Theorem 1. In the RRH tier,
transmission over RBs that are only allocated to RRHs plays a dominant role in the overall throughput [11],
compared to using RBs shared by the RRHs and MBSs. As a consequence, (38) can be approximately evaluated
as
EERRH
(a)≈ αBoC¯R,k
PR
εR
, (39)
where (a) is obtained by omitting the power consumptions from static hardware and fronthaul link, compared
to the RRH transmit power. It is implied from (39) that the EE for RRH transmission can be linearly improved
by allocating more RBs to the RRHs. From (13), we note that C¯R,k increases with density of RRHs and MBSs.
Hence we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2. EE for RRH transmission is improved by increasing the density of RRHs and MBSs in the
heterogeneous C-RAN, due to the fact that the distance between the user and its associated RRH is shorter,
hence increasing the throughput.
Likewise, the EE for transmission from a typical MBS can at least achieve
EEMBS =
(1− α)KBoSC¯LM,ν
P totalM
(b)≈ BoSC¯
L
M,ν
PM
εM
+
3∑
ρ=1
(
(S)ρΛρ,0 + (S)
(ρ−1)NMΛρ,1
) , (40)
where P totalM represents the total power consumption at each MBS given by (12), (b) is obtained by the fact
that the power consumptions from static hardware and backhaul link are negligible compared to the massive
MIMO processing. In (40), C¯LM,ν is given by (23), based on Theorem 3. From (40), we see that S-FFR has
negligible effect on the EE of MBS transmission.
In light of the aforementioned, we conclude that the EE of the massive MIMO enabled heterogeneous C-RAN
is improved by increasing the RRH density and RBs only used by RRHs.
We next evaluate the EE of this network. Using the Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 in Section III, we know
that the EE of the massive MIMO enabled heterogeneous C-RAN can at lease achieve
EENet =
Area throughput of the network
Area Power Consumption of the network
=
λRαKBoC¯R,k + (1− α)KBo
(
λRC¯R,ν + λMSC¯
L
M,ν
)
λRP totalR + λMP
total
M
. (41)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to evaluate the secrecy and EE of the massive MIMO enabled
heterogeneous C-RAN (abbreviated as Het C-RAN in the figures). We consider a circular region with radius
1 × 104 m. Such a network is assumed to operate at a carrier frequency of 1 GHz, with the MBS transmit
power PM = 40 dBm, the RRH transmit power PR = 30 dBm, the RB bandwidth B0 = 800 kHz, and the
total number of RBs K = 25. The power spectrum densities are N0 = N1 = Ne = −162 dBm/Hz [6]. The
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static hardware power consumption for RRH and HPN are P 0R =0.1 W and P 0M =10 W, respectively, and the
power consumption of the fronthaul link and backhaul link are Pfh = Pbh = 0.2 W. We set the coefficients for
power consumption under ZFBF precoding in (12) as P 0M = 4 W, Λ1,0 = 4.8, Λ2,0 = 0, Λ3,0 = 2.08× 10−8,
Λ1,1 = 1, Λ2,1 = 9.5× 10−8 and Λ3,1 = 6.25× 10−8 [22]. In the simulation results, the values of MBS and
RRH density are set based on the macro inter-site distance (ISD) in 3GPP model [29].
A. The Effects of Massive MIMO
Fig. 2 analyzes the effects of massive MIMO on the area ergodic secrecy rate. The analytical curves for
area ergodic secrecy rate of the RRH tier were obtained from (22), which have a precise match to the results
obtained using the Monte-Carlo simulations marked by ‘◦’. The lower bound curves for area ergodic secrecy
rate of the MBS tier were obtained from using (27), which can efficiently predict the performance behavior.
As mentioned in Remark 3 of Section III-A, we observe that the area ergodic secrecy rate increases with the
number of MBS antennas, due to more array gains obtained by the legitimate user. Increasing the number of
served users can also significantly improve the ergodic secrecy rate. The area ergodic secrecy rate of the RRH
tier remains unchanged with increasing the number of MBS antennas, since employing more MBS antennas
will not cause more interference in the network. Nevertheless, it will substantially increase with the density of
RRHs. Fig. 3 provides the results for the secrecy outage probability and connection outage probability of MBS
transmission operating in delay-limited mode. With increasing the number of served users, the secrecy outage
probability decreases and the connection outage probability increases. The reason is that the transmit power
allocated to each user data stream decreases when serving more users at the MBS, which in turn decreases
the receive SINR at both the legitimate user and eavesdroppers. To decrease the connection outage probability
without altering the secrecy outage probability, MBSs can be equipped with more antennas to provide larger
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array gains for the legitimate users. In addition, it is obvious that more eavesdroppers will deteriorate the secrecy
performance.
Fig. 4 shows the ergodic capacity C¯e∗ of the most malicious eavesdropper’s channel and the ergodic capacity
C¯M of the macrocell user’s channel for MBS transmission in delay-tolerant mode. When adding more MBS
antennas, C¯e
∗ is unaltered and C¯M experiences a substantial increase, since only the legitimate macrocell users
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can obtain the array gains. Additionally, serving more users at the MBS decreases C¯e∗ and C¯M, because of
lower transmit power per user data stream at the MBS as mentioned in Fig 3.
Fig. 5 illustrates the effects of massive MIMO on the EE. Results indicate that the EE of MBS transmission
is improved by serving more users at the MBS, which is attributed to the fact that more multiplexing gain
is achieved. Although adding more antennas at the MBS can provide a large array gain, there is a significant
increase in power consumption resulting from massive MIMO baseband processing, which decreases the EE
of MBS transmission. In addition, the RRHs achieve higher EE than the MBSs, as they use lower transmit
power and do not consume power for baseband processing, and results also demonstrate that massive MIMO
has negligible effect on the EE of RRH transmission.
B. The Effects of RRH Density
Fig. 6 shows the effects of RRH density on area ergodic secrecy rate. We observe that when more RRHs
are deployed, there is a substantial increase in the area ergodic secrecy rate of the RRH tier, as illustrated in
Remark 2 of Section III-A. The area ergodic secrecy rate of the MBS tier can also increase with the density
of RRH, since users with far-away MBSs will be offloaded to the RRHs. RRH tier can achieve higher area
ergodic secrecy rate than the massive MIMO aided MBS tier when the RRHs are denser than the MBSs. In
addition, slightly increasing the number of massive MIMO macrocells brings large improvement in the area
ergodic secrecy rate of the MBS tier because more users can be served, and it also improves the area ergodic
secrecy rate of the RRH tier due to the fact that users with far-away RRHs will be offloaded to the MBSs.
Fig. 7 shows the secrecy outage probability and connection outage probability of RRH transmission in delay-
limited mode. Specifically, Fig. 7(a) focuses on the performance when RRH transmissions operate over the RBs
only allocated to RRHs, while Fig. 7(b) concentrates on the performance when RRH transmissions operate over
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Fig. 7. Secrecy outage probability and connection outage probability for RRH transmission in delay-limited mode.
the RBs shared by RRHs and MBSs. As stated in Remark 5 of Section III-B, the secrecy outage probability
experiences a massive decline when increasing the density of RRHs, due to more severe interference on the
Eves but the connection outage probability is unaltered since the inter-RRH interference is mitigated in the
C-RAN, as mentioned in Remark 4. Compared with the use of RBs shared by RRHs and MBSs, RRH achieves
better performance by using the RBs only used by RRHs, due to the absence of inter-tier interference in these
RBs.
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Fig. 8 shows the ergodic capacity C¯e∗ of the most malicious eavesdropper’s channel and the ergodic capacity
C¯R of the C-RAN user’s channel for RRH transmission in delay-tolerant mode. As suggested in Remark 2,
deploying more RRHs can significantly decrease C¯e∗ and increase C¯R. For RRH transmission over the RB
shared by RRHs and MBSs, interference from the MBS tier has a large negative impact on the performance
at the legitimate users, however, its impact on the degradation of the most malicious eavesdropper’s channel is
limited compared to more interference from dense RRHs.
Fig. 9 shows the effects of RRH density on the EE. As mentioned in Corollary 2 of Section IV, when
increasing the density of RRHs, the EE of RRH transmission is significantly improved. Increasing the density
of MBSs improves the EE of RRH transmission but decreases the EE of MBS transmission, since users with
far-away RRHs are offloaded to the MBSs. The EE of the Het C-RAN decreases with increasing the density of
MBSs, due to the fact that power consumption of the network is significantly boosted by using more massive
MIMO MBSs. Since RRHs achieve higher EE, more RRHs should be deployed in the Het C-RAN to enhance
the EE.
C. The Effects of S-FFR
Results in Fig. 10 demonstrate the effects of S-FFR on area ergodic secrecy rate. It is obvious that with
more RBs allocated to the RRHs, the area ergodic secrecy rate increases for the RRH tier, and decreases for
the MBS tier. The RRH tier can achieve higher area ergodic secrecy rate than the MBS tier, when the density
of RRHs and the allocated RBs are large. More importantly, it is implied that the effect of S-FFR on the area
ergodic secrecy rate of the network can be distinct depending on the RRH density.
19
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
× 10
6
E
E
 (
b
it
s/
Jo
u
le
)
λR (× λo)
25201510 5
RRH
Het C-RAN  
MBS 
RRH,
 
λM=5λo
MBS,
 
λM= λo
Het C-RAN,
 
λM=5λo
RRH,
 
λM λo
MBS,  λM=5λ
Het C-RAN,  λM=λo
=
o
Fig. 9. Effects of RRH density on the EE: λo =
(
5002 × pi
)
−1
m−2, NM = 400, S = 30, ηM = 3.0, ηR = 3.6, and
α = 0.7.
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
α
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
A
re
a 
er
g
o
d
ic
 s
ec
re
cy
 r
at
e 
(b
it
s/
s/
m
 )2
RRH, λR=20 λM
MBS, λR=20 λM
Het C-RAN, λR=20 λM
RRH,
 
λR=10 λM
MBS, λR=10 λM
Het C-RAN, λR=10 λM Het C-RAN
RRH
MBS
Fig. 10. Effects of S-FFR on area ergodic secrecy rate: λM =
(
5002 × pi
)
−1
m−2, λe = 5 ∗ 10
−5 m−2, NM = 400,
S = 25, ηM = 3.5, and ηR = 3.3.
20
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
× 10
6
RRH, λR=20 λM
MBS, λR=20 λM
Het C-RAN, λR=20 λM
RRH, λR=10 λM
MBS, λR=10 λM
Het C-RAN,
 
λR=10 λM
α
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
E
E
 (
b
it
s/
Jo
u
le
)
MBS
Het C-RAN  
RRH
Fig. 11. Effects of S-FFR on the EE: λM =
(
5002 × pi
)
−1
m−2, λe = 5 ∗ 10
−5 m−2, NM = 400, S = 25, ηM = 3.5,
and ηR = 3.3.
Finally, Fig. 11 provides the effects of S-FFR on the EE. As mentioned in section IV, the EE for RRH
transmission is indeed linearly improved by allocating more RBs to the RRHs without the harm of inter-tier
interference. S-FFR indeed has little effect on the EE of MBS transmission. Therefore, the EE of the network
increases with the RRH density and RBs only used by RRHs, as shown in this figure.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the physical layer secrecy and EE in the two-tier massive MIMO aided hetero-
geneous C-RAN, where massive MIMO empowered macrocell BSs and RRHs coexist. The implementation of
S-FFR was utilized to suppress the inter-tier interference. We first studied the impacts of massive MIMO and
C-RAN on the secrecy performance in terms of the area ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability.
Then we evaluated the EE in such networks. Our results demonstrated that both C-RAN and massive MIMO
can significantly enhance the secrecy performance. The implementation of C-RAN with low power cost RRHs
improves EE of the networks substantially.
APPENDIX A: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 1
When using the k-th RB allocated to the RRHs, the ergodic capacity of the channel between the typical
RRH and its served user is given by
C¯R,k = E {log2 (1 + γR,k)}
=
∫ ∞
0
EhR,k
{
log2
(
1 +
PRβ
BoNo
hR,kx
−ηR
)}
f|Xo,R| (x) dx. (A.1)
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Considering that hR,k ∼ exp(1), we further have
C¯R,k =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
{∫ ∞
0
1
1 + t
e
−BoNo
PRβ
xηR t
dt
}
f|Xo,R| (x) dx
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
e
BoNo
PRβ
xηR
Γ
(
0,
BoNo
PRβ
xηR
)
f|Xo,R| (x) dx, (A.2)
where f|Xo,R| (x) is the probability density function (PDF) of the distance between the typical RRH and its
intended user, using the similar approach in [30], f|Xo,R| (x) is given by
f|Xo,R| (x) =
2πλR
AR xe
−π(λR+λM)x
2
, (A.3)
where AR = λRλR+λM is the probability that a user is associated with the RRH. By plugging (A.3) into (A.2),
we get (13).
When using the ν-th RB shared by the RRHs and MBSs, the ergodic capacity of the channel between the
typical RRH and its served user is given by
C¯R,ν = E {log2 (1 + γR,ν)}
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
E|Xo,R|=x {log2 (1 + γR,ν)} f|Xo,R| (x) dx
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
[∫ ∞
0
F¯γR,ν |{|Xo,R|=x} (γ)
1 + γ
dγ
]
f|Xo,R| (x) dx, (A.4)
where F¯γR,ν |{|Xo,R|=x} (γ) is the CCDF of γR,ν given a distance |Xo,R| = x, which is calculated as
F¯γR,ν |{|Xo,R|=x} (γ) = Pr
(
PRhR,νβx
−ηR
IM,ν +BoNo
> γ
)
= e
−BoNo
PRβ
xηRγ
EΦM
{
e
− 1
PRβ
xηRγIM,ν
}
= e
−BoNo
PRβ
xηRγLIM,ν
(
1
PRβ
xηRγ
)
, (A.5)
where LIM,ν (·) is the laplace transform of the PDF of IM,ν , and is given by
LIM,ν (s) = E
{
exp
{
−
(∑
ℓ∈ΦM
PM
S
hℓ,νβ |Xℓ,M|−ηM
)
s
}}
(b)
= exp
{
−
∫ ∞
x
(
1− 1(
1 + sPMS βr
−ηM
)S
)
λM2πrdr
}
(c)
= exp
(
−λM2π
S∑
µ=1
(
S
µ
)∫ ∞
x
(
PM
S β
)µ
sµ (r−ηM )
µ
(
1 + sPMS βr
−ηM
)S rdr
)
= exp
{
− λM2π
S∑
µ=1
(
S
µ
)(
s
PM
S
β
)µ (−sPMS β)−µ+ 2ηM
ηM
B(
−s
PM
S
βx−ηM
)
[
µ− 2
ηM
, 1− S
]}
, (A.6)
where (b) is obtained by using the generating functional of PPP [31], (c) results from using Binomial expansion,
B(·) [·, ·] is the incomplete beta function [21, (8.391)]. By pulling (A.6) and (A.5) together, we get (15).
Substituting (A.3) into (A.4), we also get (14).
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APPENDIX B: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 2
The ergodic capacity C¯e∗R,i (i ∈ {k, ν}) of the most malicious eavesdropper’s channel is written as
C¯e
∗
R,i = E
{
log2
(
1 + γe
∗
R,i
)}
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1− Fγe∗
R,i
(x)
1 + x
dx, (B.1)
where Fγe∗
R,i
(x) denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γe∗R,i.
Based on (4), the CDF of γe∗R,k is calculated as
Fγe∗
R,k
(x) = Pr
(
γe
∗
R,k < x
)
= Pr
(
max
e∈Φe
{
PRh
e
R,kβ
∣∣Xeo,R∣∣−ηR
IeR,k +BoNe
}
< x
)
= EΦe
{ ∏
e∈Φe
Pr
(
PRh
e
R,kβ
∣∣Xeo,R∣∣−ηR
IeR,k +BoNe
< x |Φe
)}
. (B.2)
Using the generating functional of the PPP Φe, Fγe∗
R,k
(x) can be further derived as
Fγe∗
R,k
(x) = exp
{
− λe
∫
R2
(
1− Pr
(PRheR,kβr−ηR
IeR,k +BoNe
< x
))
dr
}
= exp
{
− λe
∫
R2
EΦR
{
EΦM
{
exp
[− rηRx
PRβ
(
IeR,k + BoNe
) ]}}
dr
}
(a)
= exp
{
− 2πλe
∫ ∞
0
exp
[− rηRx
PRβ
BoNe
]LIe
R,k
(rηRx
PRβ
)
rdr
}
, (B.3)
where (a) results from using the polar-coordinate system, LIe
R,k
(·) is the laplace transform of the PDF of IeR,k.
Likewise, the CDF of γe∗R,ν is calculated as
Fγe∗
R,ν
(x) = Pr
(
γe
∗
R,ν < x
)
= Pr
(
max
e∈Φe
{
PRh
e
R,νβ
∣∣Xeo,R∣∣−ηR
IeR,ν + I
e
M,ν +BoNe
}
< x
)
= EΦe
{ ∏
e∈Φe
Pr
(
PRh
e
R,νβ
∣∣Xeo,R∣∣−ηR
IeM,ν + I
e
R,ν +BoNe
< x |Φe
)}
= exp
{
− 2πλe
∫ ∞
0
exp
[− rηRx
PRβ
BoNe
]
LIe
R,ν
(rηRx
PRβ
)LIe
M,ν
(rηRx
PRβ
)
rdr
}
, (B.4)
where LIe
R,ν
(·) and LIe
M,ν
(·) are the laplace transforms of the PDFs of IeR,ν and IeM,ν , respectively.
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By using the Slivnyak’s theorem and the generating functional of the PPP ΦR, LIe
R,i
(·) (i ∈ {k, ν}) is given
by
LIe
R,i
(s) = E
{
exp
(−sIeR,i)}
= exp
(
−2πλR
∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1
(1 + sPRβr−ηR )
)
rdr
)
= exp
(
−λRπ (PRβ)
2
ηR Γ
(
1 +
2
ηR
)
Γ
(
1− 2
ηR
)
s
2
ηR
)
. (B.5)
Similarly, IeM,ν is given by
LIe
M,ν
(s) = exp
[
−2πλM
∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1(
1 + sPMS βr
−ηM
)S
)
rdr
]
= exp
[
− 2πλM
S∑
µ=1
(
S
µ
)(
s
PM
S
β
) 2
ηM
Γ
(
µ− 2ηM
)
Γ
(
−µ+ 2ηM + S
)
ηMΓ (S)
]
. (B.6)
Substituting (B.5) into (B.3), we get Fγe∗
R,k
(·) as (17). Then, substituting (B.5) and (B.6) into (B.4), we get
Fγe∗
R,ν
(·) as (19).
APPENDIX C: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 3
The ergodic capacity of the channel between the typical MBS and its served user is written as
C¯M,ν = E {log2 (1 + γM,ν)} . (C.1)
By using Jensen’s inequality, a tight lower bound for C¯M,ν is given by [25]
C¯LM,ν = log2
(
1 + eZ3+Z4
)
, (C.2)
where
Z3 = E
{
ln
(
PM
S
gM,νβ |Xo,M|−ηM
)}
, (C.3)
and
Z4 = E
{
ln
(
1
JM,ν + JR,ν +BoN1
)}
. (C.4)
We first calculate Z3 as
Z3 = ln
(
PM
S
β
)
+E {ln (gM,ν)} − ηME {ln (|Xo,M|)} . (C.5)
Considering that gM,ν ∼ Γ (NM − S + 1, 1), E {ln (gM,ν)} is given by
E {ln (gM,ν)} =
∫ ∞
0
xNM−Se−x
(NM − S)! ln (x) dx
(a)
= ψ (NM − S + 1) , (C.6)
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where (a) results from using ∫∞0 xv−1e−µx lnxdx = µ−vΓ (v) (ψ (v)− lnµ) [21, (4.352.1)]. Then, E {ln (|Xo,M|)}
is derived as
E {ln (|Xo,M|)}
(b)
=
∫ ∞
0
ln (x) f|Xo,M| (x) dx
=
∫ ∞
0
ln (x)
2πλM
AM xe
−π(λR+λM)x
2
dx
=
1
2
(ψ (1)− ln (π (λR + λM))) . (C.7)
In (b) above, f|Xo,M| (x) is the PDF of the distance between the typical MBS and its intended user, which can
be directly obtained following (A.3), and AM = λMλR+λM is the probability that a user is associated with the
MBS. By substituting (C.6) and (C.7) into (C.5), we obtain Z3 as
Z3 = ln
(
PM
S
β
)
+ ψ (NM − S + 1)
− ηM
2
(ψ (1)− ln (π (λR + λM))) . (C.8)
From (C.4), considering the convexity of ln
(
1
1+x
)
and using Jensen’s inequality, we derive the lower bound
on the Z4 as
Z4 ≥ Z¯4 = ln
(
1
E {JM,ν}+ E {JR,ν}+BoN1
)
. (C.9)
Then, we have
E {JM,ν} =
∫ ∞
0
E


∑
ℓ∈ΦM/o
PM
S
gℓ,νβ |Xℓ,M|−ηM

 f|Xo,M| (x) dx
(c)
=
∫ ∞
0
(
PMβ2πλM
∫ ∞
x
r1−ηMdr
)
f|Xo,M| (x) dx
=
PMβ2πλMΓ
(
2− ηM2
)
(ηM − 2) (πλM + πλR)1−
ηM
2
, (C.10)
where (c) results from using Campbell’s theorem [32]. Likewise, E {JR,ν} is calculated as
E {JR,ν} =
∫ ∞
0
E


∑
j∈ΦR
PRgj,νβ |Xj,R|−ηR

 f|Xo,M| (x) dx
=
PRβ2πλRΓ
(
2− ηR2
)
(ηR − 2) (πλM + πλR)1−
ηR
2
. (C.11)
Substituting (C.8) and (C.9) into (C.2), we obtain (23).
APPENDIX D: A DETAILED DERIVATION OF COROLLARY 1
When the connection outage constraint P coR,k (R) = σ, using (28), we can easily get (30).
For connection outage constraint on the RRH transmission over the ν-th RB shared by RRHs and MBSs,
namely P coR,ν (R) = σ, we have
F¯γR,ν |{|Xo,R|=do}
(
2R − 1) = 1− σ. (D.1)
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Since the noise can be ignored compared with the inter-tier interference from MBSs, based on (A.5) and (A.6),
we consider the worse case that interferers are located everywhere in the plane and derive the lower bound for
F¯γR,ν |{|Xo,R|=do} (·) as
F¯LγR,ν |{|Xo,R|=do} (γ)
= exp

−
∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1(
1 + PMd
ηR
o γ
PRS
r−ηM
)S
)
λM2πrdr


= exp
(
− 2πλM
(
PMd
ηR
o
PRS
γ
) 2
ηM
S∑
µ=1
(
S
µ
)
Γ
(
µ− 2ηM
)
Γ
(
−µ+ 2ηM + S
)
ηMΓ (S)
)
. (D.2)
Substituting (D.2) into (D.1), after some manipulations, we obtain (31).
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